Introduction
A recurrent theme in the modern literature on the economics of financial markets is the extent to which stock market swings reflect changes in the present discounted value of expected future earnings or the 'animal spirits' of investors.
For example, the rapid acceleration in stock prices during the 1990s can be explained both by changes in expected investor payoffs in response to the accumulation of intangible capital by firms (e.g., Hall, 2001) , and by behavioral phenomenon that caused a speculative bubble (e.g., Shiller, 2001) . Whether swings in the stock market are driven by the diffusion of new technologies or by periods of irrational exuberance is an important question in the economics of innovation and finance.
While this question is central to the debate over the causes of the recent stock market boom and bust it is also important to a fuller understanding of another major event in the American stock market -the run-up in equity prices during the 1920s and the Great Crash of 1929. While Irving Fisher famously reported on the eve of the Crash that stock prices would remain permanently higher than in past years due to the arrival of new technologies and advances in managerial organization that created positive expectations about future profits and dividend growth, retrospective analysis has indicated the presence of a 'bubble' (DeLong and Shleifer, 1991; Rappoport and White 1993, 1994) . The speculative bubble hypothesis has become orthodox in the literature given that the S&P Composite Index fell by more than 80 percent from its September 1929 peak to its level in June 1932. The Great Crash is the canonical example in American financial history of market prices diverging significantly from fundamentals.
Despite the conventional wisdom that stock market prices were unrealistically high during the 1920s, we know little about the types of assets that investors are said to have been overvaluing. In particular, evidence on the relationship between innovation and the stock market is sparse. How rapid was the growth of intangible capital during this period? Did the stock market encourage investment in innovation? Did a technological revolution lead to higher stock market valuations? This article attempts to answer these questions using a rich dataset of balance sheets, stock prices and patent citations for 121 publicly traded corporations between 1908 and 1929. The aim is to determine whether movements in stock prices can be correlated with the intangible assets of firms, and why it matters whether markets in the 1920s got valuations right.
The new data leads to at least two advances over the current literature.
First, it introduces a robust measure of intangible capital based on the patenting activity of firms during the 1920s. Although patents are a noisy measure of innovation, citations to patents in the current data set in patent grants between 1976 and 2002 significantly enhance the signal-to-noise ratio. Aside from McGratten and Prescott (2005) who present estimates of intangible capital for U.S. corporations during the 1920s, there is no systematic data on the intangible percent increase in the firm's stock of cited patents is associated with a 0.26 percent increase in market value during the 1920s. The returns to intangible capital were approximately three times larger during the 1920s compared to the 1910s reflecting large changes in the configuration of company assets between these decades. Moreover, as the ratio of the coefficient on intangibles to the coefficient on tangible capital is bigger for the 1920s, there appears to have been a major shift in investor psychology towards intangibles during the stock market boom. One implication of these findings is that investors were not only more responsive to intangible capital at this time, but through triggering large stock market payoffs for innovation they also encouraged its growth.
Intangible Capital and the Financing of Innovation
The finding that during the 1990s stock market run-up unmeasured intangible capital was an important element of a firm's market value (e.g., Hall, 2000 Hall, , 2001 makes an historical perspective on this issue appealing. Parente and Prescott (2000) have commented that, "unmeasured investment is big and could be as much as 50% of GDP". McGrattan and Prescott's (2001) calculations suggest that the growth of intangible capital may explain the postwar increase in the ratio of total market capitalization to GNP from around 0.5 in 1950 to 1.8 in the first half of 2000.
Unlike the literature on the modern period, however, intangible capital is often omitted from discussions of financial markets during the 1920s. This is a surprising omission, to the extent that intangibles are likely to be significant in stock market valuations. For example, McGratten and Prescott (2005) (Lamoreaux, 1985) . The centralized R&D lab became a focal point for innovation, and was perhaps the most significant organizational change to influence the structure of American business in the early twentieth century. In 1921 General Electric had five labs in four different states. 1 By 1927 AT&T had more than 2,000 research staff working in a 400,000 square feet 13 story building on West Street in New York (National Research Council, 1927) . Through vertical integration firms avoided some of the contracting problems associated with market-based exchange, and managerial hierarchies facilitated the coordination of resources for innovation. Mowery (1983) shows that investment in research and development was positively correlated with firm survival rates between 1921 and 1946. Scientific knowledge became increasingly exploited as firms developed larger stocks of organizational capital. Within firms, star scientists played central roles in the commercialization of basic science, though unlike their counterparts in the life sciences today few went on to start their own enterprises. Irving Langmuir spent more than four decades at General Electric, his experiments leading to the invention of the gas filled incandescent lamp and a Nobel Prize for chemistry in 1932. At Du Pont's research center during the 1920s, Wallace Carothers' investigations into the molecular structure of polymers led to the discovery of neoprene, and nylon which were commercialized in the early 1930s (Hounshell and Smith, 1988) . At Eastman Kodak, Kenneth Mees and Samuel Sheppard significantly advanced the science of photography; by reducing the width of photographic film Kodak's research scientists permitted ever smaller lighter weight cameras to be introduced.
The institutionalization of innovation also extended beyond the boundaries of the firm as science in universities began to influence the direction of technological change in industry (MacGarvie and Furman, 2005) . Science and technology also complemented larger stocks of human capital in the economy. David (1990) reveals how falling prices for electrical capital goods after the First World War encouraged electrification of the mass production economy, which in turn increased the demand for skilled, literate, and educated labor (Goldin, 2001) .
It is a reasonable a priori assumption that complementarities between innovation, organizational changes and human capital impacted the stock market during this epoch in much the same way as researchers have discovered they do today (Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt, 2002) . The large early twentieth century American corporation was the principal agent of organizational and technological change according to Chandler (1990) . White (1990) suggests that General Motors was attractive to investors during the 1920s because its more advanced management and organization facilitated smooth transitions from one production run to the next. Klepper and Simons (2000) show how firms with the favorable mix of innovation and complementary assets (such as marketing channels) were more likely to survive the shakeout of producers in the tire industry.
Intangible capital growth was also encouraged as markets developed to finance innovation, and investors became responsive to holding equities.
According to Peach (1941) the public became more willing to hold different types of securities issued by corporations following their successful experiences with Liberty Bonds during the First World War. O'Sullivan (2004) documents a major financing role for the 1920s U.S. stock market as companies increasingly utilized external sources of finance. According to Rajan and Zingales (1998) financial development is positively correlated with the allocation of capital to areas of highest value. Nicholas (2003) shows for the 1920s that bond and stock issues by companies were positively correlated with their propensity to innovate. This finding is consistent with Schumpeter's (1942) contention that a developed and efficiently functioning capital market extends the frontier of technological progress.
Historical Balance Sheets and Patents
In order to empirically track the development of intangible capital and stock market value at the firm-level during the early twentieth century, I collate data on company financials and historical patent citations. The approach is similar to studies of the modern period which, given limited disclosures by companies concerning expenditures on intangibles, utilize indirect measures of intangible assets. For example, Bond and Cummins (2000) use R&D and advertising outflows to proxy for investment in intangibles, while Brynjolfsson, Hitt and Yang (2000) infer that computer related intangibles are substantial because the coefficient on the stock of computer capital in market value regressions is much larger than other types of productive assets. 2 Although patents are an imperfect proxy for intangible assets, when combined with historical citations statistics they provide a valuable source for tracing the dynamics of technological progress.
Company Financials
Before discussing the data on intangibles, as measured by patents and historical citations, it is helpful to describe the company financial data. The main sources The main financial variables used in this analysis are calculated using the methodology proposed by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) . The market value of the firm is measured as the product of common equity and year-end market price, plus the book value of outstanding debt and the value of preferred stock (which is assumed to be a perpetuity discounted at the average industrial bond yield reported by Moody's). Capital assets (k) are estimated using the recursive formula
where i is the GNP implicit deflator,  is the depreciation rate at an assumed five percent and the subscripts rc and bv denote replacement value and book value respectively. Inventory is estimated at replacement cost by adjusting for inflation through the wholesale price index from Historical Statistics of the United States: 1790-1950. Tobin's q is then calculated as the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its tangible assets. Descriptive statistics on these variables are given in Table 1 .
Historical Patent Citations
Table 1 also includes summary data on patenting. Patent data were assembled from the USPTO and the European Patent Office (EPO) for each firm in the sample. Over 35,000 patent grants were assigned to the 121 firms between 1908 and 1929, with 19,948 being assigned between 1920 and 1929. Figure 2 illustrates the level of patenting activity by firm year. High frequency patenting firms like Westinghouse, which peaked at 564 patent grants in 1929 are included alongside lower frequency patenting firms like Otis Elevator, which peaked at 26 patent grants in 1928. Twenty-one firms in the sample did not patent at all. Patent counts are commonly used to proxy for innovation, but this measure is prone to error because not all inventions are patented, and the quality of patents varies widely (Griliches, 1990) . To improve the quality of the patent measure, I use citations to 1920s patents in patent grants between 1976 and 2002.
The assumption is that citations distinguish the frontier of knowledge regardless of how far back in time they go. It can be argued that inventors and patent examiners habitually cite patents from the past without regard to prior art.
However, if innovation is cumulative, as suggested by Scotchmer (1991) , and citations come from the frontier, these references will reflect knowledge transfers between generations of inventors.
Of the 19,948 patents granted to firms between 1920 and 1929, 21 percent are cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002. Of the 4,215 patents cited, 2,548 receive one citation while 1,667 receive two or more citations, with the maximum number of cites for a patent being 27. This is a notable number of citations given that citations fall off sharply a decade after the patent's grant date (Caballero and Jaffe, 1993) . To show how large this proportion is, I collected data on 132 successful grants by the USPTO between 1910 and 1930 to the great inventor-entrepreneur Thomas Edison. Great inventors were typically entrepreneurial figures who developed important inventions in response to market demand (Khan and Sokoloff, 1993) . Forty-two (31.8 percent) of Edison's patents are cited in patents granted between 1976 and 2002. Although this proportion may be inflated if patent examiners have a propensity to "cite the classics" I use Edison's patents as a benchmark for the upper tail of the patent quality distribution. This comparison suggests that the proportion of citations observed for the firms in the sample is both large and significant.
Patents as Intangibles
Recent research suggests that the 1930s was the most technologically progressive decade of the twentieth century. And the significance of productivity growth during this period may be attached to technological "larder-stocking during the 1920s and earlier, upon which measured advance built" (Field, 2003) . Insofar as the patent citation data reveal that the 1920s was a major epoch of technological innovation, how far can patent rates be used to measure the stock of intangible capital in the economy?
It is important to note at the outset that this measure is imperfect.
Although 21 firms in the sample did not patent, their stock of intangible capital was undoubtedly greater than zero. Innovations in food processing, for instance, are much less likely to be patented compared to innovations in machinery (Moser, 2005 More generally, patents were critical for appropriability during the 1920s.
Extrapolating backwards from Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) 'discrete' industries such as chemicals in which patent protection is deemed to be important were cornerstones of industry structure in the early twentieth century. Mokyr (1990) puts innovations in chemicals at the heart of the second industrial revolution. Patents not only increased the effectiveness of research and development activities, but they also enhanced the market power of incumbents. Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole (2003) argue that patent pools were a principal means through which firms during the early twentieth century used intellectual property rights to foster collusion. For example, the American conglomerates Du Pont, Standard Oil, Allied Chemicals, the English firm I.C.I. and I.G. Farben of Germany captured a commanding share of the fertilizer market through 1,800 patents relating to the synthetic nitrogen process (Comer, 1942, p.161) . and Ingersoll-Rand) the fact that the correspondence is close for others warrants a more systematic investigation of the links between financial markets and the intangible assets of firms.
Estimating the Market Value of Intangibles
To analyze the data more systematically, I use an empirical approach developed from a simple model that relates patents to market value. The market value model of Griliches (1990) assumes an efficiently functioning financial market where the value of a firm ( v ) depends on the evolution of its cash flows, which firms attempt to maximize from their mix of tangible ( k ) and intangible ( g ) assets.
This gives a value function of the form (1) where  is the market premium or discount over tangible assets and  represents the relative shadow value of intangibles. Using a standard linear approximation of this value function yields
(2) where q is the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement cost of its assets. The coefficient 1  measures the value of intangible assets relative to the tangible assets of the firm. If the value of the firm exceeds its replacement cost, the intuition behind this model is that the difference can be explained by the presence of intangibles (i.e.,
Although the logarithm of q is commonly used as a dependent variable, I prefer a specification (3) year dummies the with the firm's normalized stock of patents are also included. To analyze the returns to intangible capital over major swings in the stock market and to obtain more refined estimates with citation data, which I have for 1920-1929, equation 3 is estimated for two panels, 1908-1918 and 1919-1929. 3 
Results
Referring back to the descriptive statistics in Table 1 , and the plots in Figures 3 and 4, it is clear that as the market value of companies grew during the 1920s the patenting activity of these firms also increased. The aim of this section is to determine whether anything more systematic can be concluded from the relationship between these variables.
Before discussing the results themselves it is important to consider an issue that has a wider bearing on the interpretation of the findings --the direction of causality between patenting and q. Taking a cue from the empirical literature on the q-model of investment, authors such as Barro (1990) For the overall interpretation of the current results the simultaneous association between innovation and market value is not so problematic. After all, the central argument is that investors were both alert to the opportunities presented by companies with stocks of intangible capital, which also encouraged further investment in innovation: both effects fed of each other concurrently, and access to external sources of corporate finance probably played a mediating role (Nicholas, 2003) . However, a related issue still remains --measuring and interpreting the size and significance of the relationship between patenting and market value.
To address this issue differences in parameter estimates between periods are used. Steel. Old firms did not fall away altogether, but rather the threat of creative destruction encouraged preemptive innovation to prevent the dissipation of industry profits. A buoyant industrial sector (Klepper, 2002, p.646 , reports that more than 500 firms entered the automobile industry in its first twenty years) meant that new firms seized opportunities ignored by inefficient incumbents.
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The 1920s was probably the first period in history when investors began to assess the intangible assets of companies. This would have required a major shift in investor psychology towards the bundle of assets that comprise a firm, and a favorable assessment of the equity risk premium. The nuts and bolts of the railroad corporation were much easier for investors to value than the intangible assets of the 1920s technology firm. The results in Table 2 provide year. Nevertheless, the coefficients for 1926-1928 provide enough evidence to support the view that stock market appreciation during the run-up to the Crash was connected to expectations about the intangible capital embodied in firms.
Discussion and Conclusions
Intangible capital growth was substantial in 1920s America, investors realized it, and they integrated this information into their market pricing decisions. Recall that q is computed using tangible capital, and therefore q can exceed unity as intangible assets become a larger fraction of total assets. The most important source of variation in q during the 1920s was the change in stock market prices. Table 1 shows that average q was very low in 1920 ( The basic assumption underlying this analysis is that the value of intangible assets can be inferred from the gap between q and the replacement value of capital derived from the firm's balance sheet. A common criticism of this approach is that market participants do not accurately observe intangibles and therefore the market value regression may recover an inefficient estimate of intangible value (Bond and Cummins, 2000) . Yet, the evidence here supports the hypothesis that investors were receiving information about intangible capital during the 1920s. I measure their response to fundamentals by the value attached to citation weighted patents. The fact that cited patents have substantial explanatory power (even over and above un-weighted patents) in the market value regressions shows that investors placed a premium on firms that pushed out the frontier of knowledge. Furthermore, the estimates in Table 2 show the parameter on the patent stock variable is much larger during the 1920s than the 1910s.
Therefore, the results are consistent with a major change in the psychology of investors during the stock market boom. The 1990s run-up in the stock market has been interpreted as a response to an increase in the amount of organizational capital (Hall, 2001) . Similarly, the 1920s stock market boom can be seen as a response by investors to the growth of intangibles in the economy. David (1990) describes as a "breakthrough event" in the computer revolution almost half a century later, namely Intel's silicon microprocessor. The organization of production along 'Taylorist' lines improved workplace learning and performance (Hounshell, 1984) . As the threat of creative destruction in product markets increased the marginal benefits from investing in search for new technologies, firms that innovated received sizeable stock market payoffs (Nicholas, 2003) . As capital markets became increasingly liquid due to the entry of additional investors, innovation could be financed by access to external sources of credit. Investors both financed innovation directly, and indirectly they encouraged investment in technological development by inducing stock market rewards for innovation. One argument is that the change in fundamentals during this period may have caused 'informational overshooting' (Zeira, 1999) as market participants had different expectations about how long technological change would keep dividends growing. However, retrospectively we know that productivity growth did persist, so there was no ex ante constraint on the profits and payouts of firms. General Electric, for example, was profitable throughout the depression years (O'Sullivan, 2004) . Productivity growth during the 1930s was marked (Field, 2003) . It is plausible that investors were driving up equity values in the twenties on expectations of productivity growth a decade later.
None of these reasons, which suggest that stock prices in 1929 were warranted ex ante, is meant to deny instability in financial markets on the eve of the Crash. Neither do the findings detract from the real consequences of the 1908-1918 1919-1929 1919-1929 1919-1929 
